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Abstract.This paper aims at giving an overview of the different core proto-
cols used for decentralized chat and email-oriented services. This work is part 
of a survey of 30 projects focused on decentralized and/or end-to-end encrypted 
internet messaging, currently conducted in the early stages of the H2020 CAPS 
project NEXTLEAP. 
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1. Introduction 
This exploratory paper first gives an overview of the different core protocols subtend-
ing the development of end-to-end encrypted internet messaging (chat and email-
oriented) services. In its second part, the paper outlines initial findings of a survey of 
thirty decentralized and/or end-to-end encrypted projects. The paper also presents the 
methodological opportunities and challenges of studying such systems with social 
sciences tools. 
Currently, end-to-end encrypted messaging has risen to prominence, with the 
adoption of end-to-end encrypted messaging by large proprietary applications such as 
WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger, and the interest in securing communication priva-
cy provoked by the Snowden revelations. In “end-to-end” encrypted messaging, the 
server that hosts messages for a user or any third-party adversary that intercepts data 
as the message is en route cannot read the message content due to the use of encryp-
tion. The “end” in “end-to-end” encryption refers to the “endpoint,” which in the case 
of messaging is the client device of the user rather than the server.   
However, open standards for encrypted e-mail and chat are still not seeing wide-
spread use, and a new generation of end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols offer-
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ing better security properties are rapidly gaining traction, although most are not yet 
standardized or decentralized. The academic cryptographic community has renewed 
impetus post-Snowden to rigorously engage with the “secure messaging problem in 
the untrusted-server model,” a problem that until recently “feels almost intentionally 
pushed aside” although the problem is perhaps “the most fundamental privacy prob-
lem in cryptography:  how can parties communicate in such a way that nobody knows  
who  said  what” [1]. While the security research community has already began to 
overview the technical details of these protocols [2], what is missing from the tech-
nical work currently in progress is the needs and expectations of users when using 
encrypted end-to-end messaging applications.  
An ongoing study on the use of encryption and decentralized communication tools 
is being conducted via the H2020 CAPS (Collective Awareness Project) project 
NEXt-generation Techno-social Legal Encryption Access and Privacy 
(NEXTLEAP).
1
 NEXTLEAP seeks to address, in an interdisciplinary manner, the 
recent erosion of public trust in the Internet as a secure means of communication that 
has been prompted by the Snowden revelations. The core objective of NEXTLEAP is 
to improve, create, validate, and deploy communication protocols that can serve as 
pillars for a secure, trust-worthy and privacy-respecting Internet able to ensure citi-
zens‟ fundamental rights. For this purpose, NEXTLEAP seeks to develop an interdis-
ciplinary internet science of decentralization as the basis on which these protocols can 
not only be built, but become fully (and meaningfully) embedded in society. In this 
regard, the social aspect of end-to-end encryption must be included in the overall 
analysis of trust and decentralization at the heart of Internet Science.  
The two main kinds of projects that we seek to examine are related to email and 
chat clients (also called “instant messaging” clients), both of which are considered to 
be particular cases of messaging. Historically, e-mail is considered asynchronous 
messaging, where a user does not have to be online to receive the message, while chat 
is considered asynchronous messaging, where a user has to be online to receive the 
message.  However, in general these distinctions are blurring as any popular chat 
protocols now support asynchronous messaging. The remainder of this paper presents 
a genealogy of these fundamental protocols used for email and chat-oriented services, 
and then moves on to present preliminary findings and open questions. 
2. E-mail Protocols 
Email is based on standardized and open protocols descended insofar as the fun-
damental protocols allow interoperability between different email servers, so that a 
Microsoft server can send email to a Google server. Classically, as revealed by the 
PRISM program of the NSA, e-mail is sent unencrypted and so the server has full 
access to the content of e-mail. Thus, there has been a long-standing program to send 
email “end-to-end” encryption.  
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) is the protocol originally used for transfer-
ring email and as such is one of the oldest standards for asynchronous messaging, first 
                                                          
1 https://nextleap.eu 
defined in 1982 by the IETF
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 and by default not having provision for content confi-
dentiality using end-to-end encryption. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) was created to add 
end-to-end encryption capabilities to e-mail in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman. In part due 
to pressure from the U.S. government, and in part due to patent claims by RSA Cor-
poration, Phil Zimmerman pushed PGP to become an IETF standard. The OpenPGP 
set of standards was finally defined in 1997, to allow the open implementation of 
PGP. OpenPGP is implemented in open-source software such as Thunderbird with the 
Enigmail plug-in as well as in mobile apps, such as the IPGMail for iOS and the 
Openkeychain key management system for Android and F-Droid. GPG (GnuGPG) is 
a free software implementation of the OpenPGP standards developed by Free Soft-
ware Foundation in 1999 and compliant with the OpenPGP standard specifications, 
serving as the free software foundation for most modern PGP-enabled applications.  
Recently, the IETF has recently opened up the OpenPGP Working Group in order to 
allow the fundamental algorithms to be upgraded and to use more modern crypto-
graphic primitives, such as larger keys. 
S/MIME
3
 is another IETF standard addressing the need for encrypting e-mail. In 
contrast to PGP that is based on a decentralized “Web of Trust” between users who 
accept and sign each others keys (and so “offloads” the complexity of key manage-
ment to the end-user), S/MIME uses a centralized public key infrastructure to manage 
keys.  Thus, while it has been adopted by some large centralized institutions, it has 
had much less success among the general public and so is not part of the study. 
The problem with implementations of OpenPGP such as GPG is that they are dif-
ficult for most users to understand and use, especially in terms of usage and key man-
agement [3]. These problems extend to security: if an adversary compromises a user‟s 
private key, this allows all encrypted messages to be read. In general, while OpenPGP 
has had a resurgence of interest since 2013, it has not had as much deployment by 
ordinary users due to the aforementioned issues around user-friendliness and the fact 
that OpenPGP expects the users to understand the fundamentals of cryptography, such 
as public and private keys. 
3. Chat Protocols 
Unlike e-mail that is started as high-latency and asynchronous messaging, chat 
protocols began as low-latency synchronous messaging, although recently the line has 
become more blurred as many chat protocols allow asynchronous message delivery. 
There has long been an intuition that more and more messaging is moving from e-
mail to messaging, although it seems that e-mail is still widely used.  
XMPP (eXtensible Message and Presence Protocol) became an IETF (Internet 
Engineering Task Force) standard in 2004 for chat, and is probably the most widely 
used standardized chat protocol. XMPP is a federated standard that “provides a tech-
nology for the asynchronous, end-to-end exchange of structured data by means of 
direct, persistent XML streams among a distributed network of globally addressable, 
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presence-aware clients and servers.”
4
 There are many implementations of the XMPP 
specifications, with the XMPP Foundation giving a list of 70 clients and 25 servers 
using the XMPP protocol.
5
 Jabber.org is the original instant messaging service based 
on XMPP, and it is now one of the biggest nodes on the XMPP network. XMPP traf-
fic or content are not encrypted by default, although network-level encryption security 
using SASL and TLS has been built into the core. In addition, as claimed by the 
XMPP foundation, a team of developers is working on an upgrade of the standard to 
support end-to-end encryption.
6
 
The OTR (Off-the-Record) protocol released in 2004 is an extension to XMPP to 
provide end-to-end encryption. It also provides deniable authentication for users, 
unlike PGP messages, which can be later “used as a verifiable record of the commu-
nication event and the identities of the participants” [4]. OTR is a security upgrade 
over PGP at least insofar as it does not have long-term public keys that can be com-
promised. The original paper that defines OTR is called “"Off-the-Record Communi-
cation, or, Why Not To Use PGP” [4]. The first OTR implementation was a popular 
Linux IM client, GAIM. At the present moment it is said to be used by 14 instant 
messaging clients,
7
 including earlier versions of Cryptocat (in-browser Javascript 
client), Jitsi, and ChatSecure (XMPP client for Android and iOS). However, OTR is 
designed for synchronous messaging between two people, and so does not work for 
group messaging or asynchronous messaging. There seems to be a move away from 
OTR; the IM+ app for Android, even though having good user ranking and between 5 
and 10 million downloads, is reported by users on Google Play Market as “aban-
doned” (last update in 2014). A further inquiry will be conducted in order to under-
stand whether the reasons of abandonment are due to usability issues, to cryptograph-
ic failures or to other factors such as financial problems, maintenance costs, team 
conflicts or fusion with bigger projects. 
Recently, a number of variations and alternatives to XMPP have been developed:  
Matrix.org, released in December 2014, is designed as an “open specification for 
decentralized communication” using JSON rather than XML. Like XMPP, it is an 
application-layer communications protocol for federated real-time communication. It 
is unencrypted by default. However, using the Olm library (Axolotl ratcheting from 
the Signal Protocol, described below) encryption can be optionally achieved. Among 
the innovative features of Matrix.org compared to other standards is its interoperabili-
ty, as underlined in several articles: the main goal of the project being to “create an 
architecture that tackles the interoperability problems that were not addressed by pre-
vious approaches” [5]. Others underline its attractiveness for users that results from 
this interoperability: “where IRC has a high barrier to entry, requiring you to know 
exactly what server you're connecting to and configure accordingly, Matrix would let 
you associate with as many public identities as you're willing to share (phone number, 
email address, Facebook, Google, and so on), as long as they support the Matrix stan-
dard. Otherwise requires no setup -- it's just like if you were using any consumer mes-
saging service” [6]. However, Matrix.org seems to have few users since none of the 
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https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120#page-13 
5Ibid. 
6
http://xmpp.org/about/technology-overview.html 
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mainstream IM clients relies on it yet. The website lists 17 clients and 6 servers using 
Matrix.org.
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The Signal Protocol, the non-federated protocol developed in 2013 by Open 
Whisper Systems, provides end-to-end encryption for groups. Moxie Marlinspike, the 
co-author of Signal, was inspired with some OTR features, such as the idea of ephe-
meral key exchange [7], but also added additional security features such as future 
secrecy, support for asynchronous messaging and group messaging, going above and 
beyond OTR by allowing also clients to be offline. The Signal Protocol uses the 
“Axolotl” keyratchet for initial key exchange and the ongoing renewal and mainten-
ance of short-lived session keys, so there is not only no long-term key that can be 
compromised. This provides forward secrecy so that the compromise of a short-term 
key does not compromise past keys (so that an adversary can decrypt past messages) 
as well as “backwards secrecy” (also called “future secrecy”) so that the compromise 
of a key does not endanger future messages. It could be a standard, but is not yet rec-
ognized as such.  The Signal protocol is said to be widely used in mobile messaging 
applications such as Signal (formerly TextSecure and RedPhone), WhatsApp
9
, Secure 
Chat (by GData). Silent Circle uses a version of the Signal Protocol since 2015 in its 
Silent Phone. Recently Facebook announced the implementation of Signal Protocol 
for their Messenger
10
. The first step towards “standardization” of the Signal Protocol 
so far has been the creation of OMEMO. 
OMEMO is a new encrypted extension of XMPP protocol developed in 2015 that 
effectively copies the Signal Protocol and adopts it to XMPP. It has been presented to 
the XMPP Standards Foundation but not yet approved in any official manner.
11
10 
OMEMO builds upon the work of the Signal Protocol as OTR is said to have “inter-
client mobility problems” and can only work when all conversation participants are 
online, while OpenPGP “does not provide any kind of forward secrecy and is vulner-
able to replay attacks” [8]. The software implementations of OMEMO are growing 
such as conversations, an open-source application for Android that counts over 5000 
downloads via Google Play Market, and an unknown number of installs via F-Droid. 
4. Network-level Anonymity 
While this work is mostly focused on the application level, it seems important to men-
tion the network-level initiatives, such as P2P routing services or anonymous remai-
lers that can add supplementary privacy properties to end-to-end encrypted messag-
ing. For example, end-to-end encryption does not usually allow a user to be anonym-
ous to the server or third-party without additional network-level encryption. There 
seems to be no functional standards on this level; however, some solutions, such as 
Tor or I2P, tend to serve as references for different projects. 
                                                          
8And the “Matrix Console” messaging app for Android reportedly has “between 1000 and 5000 
downloads”. 
9WhatsApp turns to end-to-end encryption by default in April 2016. 
10https://whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger/ 
11https://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/omemo.html 
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The Tor hidden service protocol offers a platform to develop decentralized and 
encrypted instant messenger servers. It is used by default by projects such as the Tor 
Messenger, Pond and Ricochet. Another example is the decentralized and end-to-end 
encrypted mobile messenger Briar that relies on the Tor network when available, but 
could also work over Bluetooth in case of emergency off-the-grid situations.  
 
Tor provides only anonymity for network addresses, but not metadata such as the 
sender, recipient, and time of message such as are kept in the email header in the time 
of email or can be deduced by the server. There has also historically been work on 
anonymous high-latency remailers to fix these transport meta-data leaks in federated 
messaging, falling under three types: Cypherpunk Anonymous Remailer, Mixmaster, 
Mixminion. The latter is not currently active, according to the statement on the offi-
cial website.
12
 The statistics on the website show there are currently 18 Mixminion 
nodes running - compared to almost 1.2K of Tor routers. 
There has been a number of experimental tools developed on the network level 
that, while not guaranteeing anonymity, provide some level of encryption. Zero Tier 
One is an end-to-end encrypted, peer-to-peer virtual network that provides static net-
work addresses which remain stable even if the user changes physical WiFi/networks. 
CJDNS implements a virtual IPv6 network in which all packets are encrypted to the 
final recipient, using public key cryptography for network address allocation and a 
distributed hash table for routing.
13
 
5. Towards a set of criteria for categorization of messaging 
projects 
While some projects are products of wide and well-known communities (such as 
Open Whisper Systems and Tor), new services either re-use the protocols or infra-
structure independently by smaller groups and non-institutionalized developing teams. 
When standards are not available or not satisfying, there is a tendency to (re)use not 
yet officially standardized protocols and tools as standards such as Signal‟s Axolotl 
ratchet. That is why, taken in consideration this moving nebula of standards and non-
standardized projects, we have proceeded with a mapping based on a defined range of 
criteria. We do not include the case-by-case mapping details in this paper for lack of 
space
14
 but we briefly introduce the criteria that guided the analysis, and discuss some 
of its preliminary findings. 
All of the 30 projects that are included in the mapping
15
 are either centralized, 
with encrypted messages stored on (but not readable by) a central trusted authority, or 
decentralized, and so not having no central trusted authority for even storing messag-
                                                          
12http://mixminion.net/ 
13https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/doc/Whitepaper.md 
14 The full 30 case studies can be downloaded from https://nextleap.eu 
15 Briar, Caliopen, ChatSecure, CoverMe, CryptoCat, Equalit.ie, GData, i2P, Jitsi, Mailpile, 
Mailvelope, ParanoiaWorks, Patchwork, Pidgin, Pixelated, Pond, Protonmail, qTOX, Rico-
chet, Scramble, Signal, SilentCircle, SureSpot, Teem/SwellRT, Telegram, Threema, TorMes-
senger, Vuvuzela, Wickr, Wire 
es. Decentralized systems are either federated (allowing multiple servers, including 
users setting up their own servers), or peer-to-peer (allowing direct communication 
between client devices). For the purpose of subsequent investigations with social 
science methods of ethnography, in-depth interviews and documental research, there 
are a number of features we seek to identify. We pay particular attention to open 
source projects, however, business closed-source solutions are also of interest. We 
take into consideration the kinds of data collected by the applications, as well as the 
purpose of this collection. For instance, some applications (e.g. Wickr) collect user 
statistics: anonymous information about basic usage statistics, such as the number of 
messages sent by all users daily, what types of messages users tend to send (e.g., 
voice messages more often than text), and so forth. The number of users, their geo-
location and the targeted user-groups must as well be defined (whether the app is 
optimized for anarchists, journalists, human right defenders, power-users or develop-
ers, enterprises, government…).  
An important caveat concerning terminology must be acknowledged here. As re-
gards (de-)centralization and federation, for the time being, we are referring to tech-
nology and algorithms. We should thus distinguish it from the “social federation”, i.e. 
the question about who controls, at a socio-political level, the instances of servers. For 
instance, from this standpoint, Bitcoin is mostly technically decentralized but socially 
centralized: there is a single core group creating and delivering the software, while 
users effectively run the same software that calculates transactions in a decentralized 
way. In order to analyze the (de)centralization of governance/power structures in 
messaging, we have to conduct an in-depth investigation. The further ethnographic 
and sociological analysis will aim at a deeper understanding of different models of 
socio-economical federation these protocols and tools produce. It is an aspect that will 
be thoroughly examined in the three in-depth case studies, and we open it up for fur-
ther investigation in the conclusions here. 
6. Preliminary findings and methodological concerns 
This diversity poses a methodological challenge of representation and accuracy, 
which will be further delved into as the research progresses; however, for the time 
being, this research opens the way to a number of preliminary socio-technical obser-
vations of the end-to-end encrypted messaging field. 
Despite the prevalence of free and open source software projects, proprietary 
software is not absent in this landscape, revealing both a potentially fruitful „business-
to-business‟ market for end-to-end encryption and a lack of open-source and stan-
dards adoption by mainstream applications. Open source itself is multi-layered and 
sometimes hybrid, with the code on the client side being open source and the server 
side being proprietary. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the proprietary features are more im-
portant in applications destined to a business-to-business use, while free and open 
source software is predominant for tools destined to activists and tech-savvy users. 
This transparency of code and encryption protocols is aimed not only at improving the 
project, but also at creating an emulation around the project producing communities 
of peer reviewers, experts, beta-testers and advanced users who participate in a collec-
tive reflection on the future of privacy-enhancing technologies.  
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As we had the occasion to observe in previous mapping research on P2P services 
[9], part of the reason why there is such a great diversity and complexity in this field 
is the relatively short life span of several projects. While our mapping covers only 
projects that are currently active (with one exception, Pond, „in stasis‟ albeit not deac-
tivated), our preliminary research revealed countless others that, after two or three 
years of pre-beta phase, and sometimes less, stopped development with no evident 
explanation. While in more than a few cases, the motives behind this are primarily 
related to a technical experimentation that did not deliver as hoped or expected, a 
number of additional factors may also be responsible, including the failure to develop 
an economic model, the internal governance of FOSS development groups, and the 
inability to rally a critical mass of users around the app (possibly due to a lack of 
ease-of-use, as discussed below). These socio-technical factors will be useful to ob-
serve in the cases eventually selected for the in-depth ethnographic analysis, as a pre-
cious source of „lessons learned‟ in terms of user recruitment and governance models.  
A social perspective is necessary for the design and refinement of technical proto-
cols, with a focus on whether or not users understand and value the various security 
properties of the protocols. For example, do users understand what a “key” is and 
forward secrecy? Often protocol designers make assumptions about whether or not 
ordinary users can understand the security and privacy properties of their protocols. 
For example, almost all protocols from PGP to Signal use methods such as “out-of-
band fingerprint verification” to determine whether or not the recipient of their mes-
sage really is who they think they are. It is unclear if users actually use these tech-
niques to verify the identity of their contacts. Another example that has been debated 
in the technical community is deniable authentication. While a protocol may be tech-
nically deniable, would this cryptographic deniability hold up socially, much less in 
court? Answering these kinds of questions influences the kinds of protocols that can 
be designed by the research community. Lastly, why do only some protocols enable 
decentralization via open standards? It is unclear if users prefer (or can even tell the 
difference between) peer-to-peer solutions and centralized services. Between these 
two extremes, there is the question of how users make trust decisions in open and 
federated environments such as PGP and XMPP where users could run their own 
software or delegate this to a trusted group. Answering these questions is vitally im-
portant to ground the design of new decentralized protocols and refine existing ones 
to become decentralized. 
The interdisciplinary character of NEXTLEAP project provides us access to sev-
eral important communities working on improving messaging protocols and encryp-
tion, such as the LEAP/Pixelated team, Cryptocat, Open Whisper Systems, Briar, 
CJDNS, Tor and others. We plan a set of interviews with the teams of three selected 
projects, as well as observations during important cryptography, decentralization and 
privacy-related events. We are focusing on both developers and users. Thanks to pre-
vious research conducted in the field of activist-targeted technologies, we have con-
nections within several activist user communities in different countries (France, Ger-
many, UK, Austria, Greece, Russia, Mexico, Tunisia, and Lebanon). We will focus on 
the patterns of adoption/rejection of different messengers/mailing clients, on users‟ 
“careers” (e.g. studying usages of encryption and privacy enhancing technologies in 
dynamic relations to the activist careers and life trajectories), with a specific interest 
in the so-called “digital migration problem” (shifting from a non-encrypted tool to 
using end-to-end encryption). 
The target audience of the applications is far from being limited to tech-savvy and 
activist groups; several projects are aimed at widespread use, and user-friendliness 
appears to be the main issue that stands between this wish and its realization in prac-
tice. Interestingly, in some instances where user feedback is visible on the App Store 
or Google Play, it shows the „digital migration‟-related issues faced by end-to-end 
encryption; for example, this model is perceived as problematic because both sender 
and receiver have to install the app for encryption to take place, which complicates 
usage.  
In the case of civic mobile and web applications studied previously [10], the num-
ber of users is explicitly made visible on the websites of the projects. It becomes an 
important tool for building user communities and empowering the impact of such 
activist projects. Whereas our analysis of the 30 projects shows that very few projects 
openly give the number of their active users (possibly due to privacy issues). A fur-
ther exploration of the three selected cases will investigate these specific politics. In 
this context, bringing methods of social science to the topic of secure messaging pro-
tocols may be useful to elucidate the underlying processes of building user communi-
ties. 
The analyzed projects propose several solutions to the problem of data storage. 
Indeed, despite the guarantees of “no personal data collection”, some projects still 
store important amounts of data on the servers (such as usage statistics, device infor-
mation, keys, usernames or friend relations). Developers tend to explain it by technic-
al requirements (e.g. proposing better user experience based on the collected usage 
statistics). However, this preliminary inquiry shows that developing communities are 
aware of the problem and are seeking for alternatives with minimal data storage, and 
opt for stronger decentralization. The analysis shows that it is the question of metada-
ta that appears to be an area of active research, stimulating experiments with stan-
dards and architectures (e.g. Vuvuzela‟s usage of “noise” to obfuscate metadata dis-
cussed in Ref. [11]). 
A look at visual aspects, such as the design of interfaces and the design of dia-
grams and graphics to explain the functioning of the applications, is also revealing of 
the different publics targeted by the applications and how the developers perceive 
them. General public-oriented systems use very „politically neutral‟ imagery, resort-
ing to the very classical „Alice and Bob‟ while stressing that their tools are for „every-
one‟ (e.g. “sharing photos from holidays”), while tools meant for companies emphas-
ize in both visuals and words the security aspect. Other narratives boast fictional 
anarchist leaders or real-life activists (e.g. „Nestor Makhno‟ or „Vera Zassulitch‟), 
which also strongly inform the target audience. 
A related issue is the powerful „double‟ narrative on end-to-end encryption. If on 
one hand, the discourse on empowerment and better protection of fundamental civil 
liberties is very strong, several projects show in parallel a desire/need to defend them-
selves from the “encryption is used by jihadists”-type allegations [12]. This narrative 
is fueled by previous and current ones about decentralized technologies and peer-to-
peer, with their history of allegedly „empowering-yet-illegal‟ tools. These issues are 
taking place in the broader context of discussions about governance by infrastructure 
and civil liberties [13], some of them particularly related to encryption (or the break-
10 
 
ing of it), such as the Apple vs. FBI case and WhatsApp proposing, since April 2016, 
encryption by default. Thus, the present research hints at something that we will tho-
roughly address in the in-depth case studies -- something a large majority of the 
projects needs to take into account, and indeed is already taking into account: archi-
tecture is politics, but it is not a substitute for politics [14]. 
7. Conclusions 
The overview of the protocols presented in this short paper is focused on stabilizing a 
list of potential case studies among decentralized internet messaging projects. A fur-
ther selection of these will be investigated in depth in the future with qualitative me-
thods, including ethnography and in-depth interviews. This is deemed necessary as 
the proliferation of projects addressing encryption, decentralization, or both, in the 
field of messaging has not led so far to massive adoption outside of a few large cen-
tralized companies such as WhatsApp, for a number of factors that go beyond tech-
nology to include difficulty of use, economic sustainability, and unclear socio-legal 
status of encrypted communication. Thus, the development of a related Internet 
science requires insight from both social science and ICTs to understand the successes 
and failures in the design of end-to decentralized protocols. 
Considering the lively and constantly-evolving ecosystem of standardized and 
non-standardized projects in the field of decentralized and encrypted messaging, it is 
important that a multi-year interdisciplinary effort such as NEXTLEAP starts with a 
comprehensive mapping of relevant protocols first, relevant projects applying them 
next, based on a defined range of criteria. This short paper presents a first exploration 
in this regard, especially peculiar from an interdisciplinary standpoint, inasmuch as it 
is elaborated by social scientists and is meant to serve their needs in the first place, as 
a pre-requisite to an in-depth, case study-based inquiry. However, this social science 
research is ultimately meant to feed back into the development of technical protocols 
– protocols that are not only technically sound, but made for users and able to find 
their way into networked societies that are increasingly concerned about the security 
and confidentiality of their online communications. 
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